The core as the set of eventually stable outcomes: A note

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bhattacharya, A; Ziad, A
• 署名单位: University of York - UK; Universite de Caen Normandie
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2004.10.002
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 25-30
• 关键词: NTU games; core; indirect domination

摘要

As a justification of the core as a set of stable social states, Sengupta and Sengupta [1996. A property of the core. Games Econ. Behav. 12, 266-273] show that for any transferable utility (TU) cooperative game with non-empty core, for every imputation outside the core there is an element in the core that indirectly dominates the imputation in a desirable way. In this note we show that this appealing property of the core no longer holds even for the class of hyperplane games, an immediate generalization of TU games into the environments without side payments. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.