Learning to trust in indefinitely repeated games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Engle-Warnick, J; Slonim, RL
• 署名单位: McGill University; University System of Ohio; Case Western Reserve University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2004.10.009
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 95-114
• 关键词: trust; repeated games; incomplete contracts; Experimental economics

摘要

Although it is well known that trust and trustworthiness (i.e., the fulfillment of trust) are important behaviors for the fulfillment of incomplete contracts, less is known about how the economic environment influences them. In this paper we design an experiment to examine how exogenously determined (stochastic) past relationship lengths affect trust and trustworthiness in new relationships. We find that shorter-lasting relationships have an immediate negative impact on both behaviors in the relationships that immediately follow, while longer-lasting relationships have the opposite effect. The effect of stochastic end-points declines for trustworthiness but not for trust as subjects gain experience, indicating that trust is able to rebound when longer-lasting relationships follow shorter-lasting ones. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.