On the dimension of the core of the assignment game

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Nunez, Marina; Rafels, Carles
• 署名单位: University of Barcelona; University of Barcelona
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.01.004
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 290-302
• 关键词: Assignment game; core; core dimension

摘要

The set of optimal matchings in the assignment matrix allows to define a reflexive and symmetric binary relation on each side of the market, the equal-partner binary relation. The number of equivalence classes of the transitive closure of the equal-partner binary relation determines the dimension of the core of the assessment game. This result provides an easy procedure to determine the dimension of the core directly from the entries of the assignment matrix and shows that the dimension of the core is not as much determined by the number of optimal matchings by their relative position. (c) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.