Does monitoring decrease work effort? The complementarity between agency and crowding-out theories

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dickinson, David; Villeval, Marie-Claire
• 署名单位: University of North Carolina; Appalachian State University; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Universite Claude Bernard Lyon 1; Universite Jean Monnet; Universite Lyon 2; IZA Institute Labor Economics
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.08.004
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 56-76
• 关键词: principal-agent theory; monitoring; Crowding-out; motivation; Real effort experiment

摘要

Agency theory assumes that tighter monitoring by the principal should motivate agents to increase their effort, whereas the crowding-out literature suggests that the opposite may occur. These two assertions are not necessarily contradictory provided that the nature of the employment relationship is taken into account [Frey, B., 1993. Does monitoring increase work effort? The rivalry between trust and loyalty. Econ. Inquiry 31, 663-670]. Results from controlled laboratory experiments show that many principals engage in costly monitoring, and most agents react to the disciplining effect of monitoring by increasing effort. However, we also find some evidence that effort is crowded out when monitoring is above a certain threshold. We identify that both interpersonal principal-agent links and concerns for the distribution of output payoff are important for the emergence of this crowding-out effect. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.