When is reputation bad?

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Ely, Jeffrey; Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K.
• 署名单位: Harvard University; Northwestern University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.08.007
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 498-526
• 关键词: Game theory; reputation; Stackelberg; COMMITMENT

摘要

In traditional reputation models, the ability to build a reputation is good for the long-run player. In [Ely, J., Valimaki, J., 2003. Bad reputation. NAJ Econ. 4, 2; http://www.najecon.org/v4.htm. Quart. J. Econ. 118 (2003) 785-814], Ely and Valimaki give an example in which reputation is unambiguously bad. This paper characterizes a class of games in which that insight holds. The key to bad reputation is that participation is optional for the short-run players, and that every action of the long-run player that makes the short-run players want to participate has a chance of being interpreted as a signal that the long-run player is bad. We allow a broad set of commitment types, allowing many types, including the Stackelberg type used to prove positive results on reputation. Although reputation need not be bad if the probability of the Stackelberg type is too high, the relative probability of the Stackelberg type can be high when all commitment types are unlikely. (C) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.