The projection dynamic and the replicator dynamic
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Sandholm, William H.; Dokumaci, Emin; Lahkar, Ratul
署名单位：
University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of London; University College London; University of London; University College London
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1016/j.geb.2008.02.003
发表日期：
2008
页码：
666-683
关键词：
摘要：
We investigate a variety of connections between the projection dynamic and the replicator dynamic. At interior population states, the standard microfoundations for the replicator dynamic can be converted into Foundations For the projection dynamic by replacing imitation of opponents with revision driven by insecurity and direct choice of alternative strategies. Both dynamics satisfy a condition called inflow-outflow symmetry, which causes them to select against strictly dominated strategies at interior states; still, because it is discontinuous at the boundary of the state space, the projection dynamic allows strictly dominated strategies to survive in perpetuity. The two dynamics exhibit qualitatively similar behavior in strictly stable and null stable games. Finally, the projection and replicator dynamics both can be viewed as gradient systems in potential games. the latter after an appropriate transformation of the state space. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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