On the use of menus in sequential common agency

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Calzolari, Giacomo; Pavan, Alessandro
• 署名单位: Northwestern University; University of Bologna
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.11.003
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 329-334
• 关键词: sequential contracting; mechanism design; menus theorems

摘要

We illustrate. by means of two examples, why assuming the principals offer simple menus (i.e. collections of payoff-relevant alternatives) as opposed to more general mechanisms may preclude a complete characterization of the set of equilibrium outcomes in certain sequential contracting environments. We then discuss how refinements of the solution concept, or enrichments of the menus that allow for recommendations, may restore the possibility of using menus to obtain a complete equilibrium characterization. (c) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.