Existence of equilibrium in common agency games with adverse selection

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Carmona, Guilherme; Fajardo, Jose
• 署名单位: Universidade Nova de Lisboa
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.10.003
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 749-760
• 关键词: Common agency; Menu games; Subgame perfect equilibrium

摘要

We establish the existence of subgame perfect equilibria in general menu games, known to be Sufficient to analyze common agency problems. Our main result states that every menu game satisfying enough continuity properties has a subgame perfect equilibrium. Despite the continuity assumptions that we make, discontinuities naturally arise due to the absence, in general, of continuous optimal choices for the agent. Our approach, then, is based on (and generalizes) the existence theorem of [Simon, L., Zame, W., 1990. Discontinuous games and endogenous sharing rules. Econometrica 58 (4), 861-872] designed for discontinuous games. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.