Moderation of an ideological party

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pokladnikova, Vlasta; Yildiz, Muhamet
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.12.010
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 516-537
• 关键词: Moderation; Ideological parties; ELECTIONS; Coup

摘要

It is a common fear in many countries that ideological parties will come to power through elections but will implement extreme policies. Many countries cope with this problem by overriding the election results when such parties are elected. We demonstrate that the alternative approach of containing these parties within the democratic system is more effective. We show that, as the probability of state's intervention in the next elections increases, an ideological party implements a more extreme policy in equilibrium. This hurts the median voter. Our main result shows that from the median voter's perspective, the optimal intervention scheme can be implemented by committing not to intervene and adjusting election times appropriately. That is, elections are a better incentive mechanism than the threat of a coup. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.