Aggregation of expert opinions
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Gerardi, Dino; McLean, Richard; Postlewaite, Andrew
署名单位：
Yale University; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; University of Pennsylvania
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1016/j.geb.2008.02.010
发表日期：
2009
页码：
339-371
关键词：
摘要：
Conflicts of interest arise between a decision maker and agents who have information pertinent to the problem because of differences in their preferences over outcomes. We investigate how the decision maker can extract the information by distorting the decisions that will be taken. We show that only slight distortions will be necessary when agents' signals are sufficiently accurate or when the number of informed agents become large. We argue that the particular mechanisms analyzed are substantially less demanding informationally than those typically employed in implementation and virtual implementation. Further, the mechanisms are immune to manipulation by small groups of agents. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.