The target projection dynamic
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Tsakas, Elias; Voorneveld, Mark
署名单位：
Stockholm School of Economics; University of Gothenburg; Maastricht University; Tilburg University
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1016/j.geb.2009.01.003
发表日期：
2009
页码：
708-719
关键词：
摘要：
We study the target projection dynamic, a model of learning in normal form games. The dynamic is given a microeconomic foundation in terms of myopic optimization under control costs due to a certain status-quo bias. We establish a number of desirable properties of the dynamic: existence, uniqueness and continuity of solution trajectories, Nash stationarity, positive correlation with payoffs, and innovation. Sufficient conditions are provided under which strictly dominated strategies are wiped out. Finally, some stability results are provided for special classes of games. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.