Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics: The continuous strategy case

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hofbauer, Josef; Oechssler, Joerg; Riedel, Frank
• 署名单位: University of Bielefeld; University of Vienna; Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.03.006
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 406-429
• 关键词: Learning in games; evolutionary stability; BNN

摘要

Brown and von Neumann introduced a dynamical system that converges to saddle points of zero sum,carries with finitely many strategies. Nash used the mapping underlying these dynamics to prove existence of equilibria in general games. The resulting Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics are a benchmark example for myopic adjustment dynamics that, in contrast to replicator dynamics. allow for innovation, but require less rationality than the best response dynamics. This paper studies the BNN dynamics for games with infinitely many strategies. We establish Nash stationarity for continuous payoff functions. For negative semidefinite games (that include zero sum games), we generalize the results of Brown and von Neumann. In addition, we show that evolutionarily robust Nash equilibria are asymptotically stable. A complete stability analysis for doubly symmetric games is also obtained. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.