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作者：Driessen, Theo; Hu, Cheng-Cheng
作者单位：University of Twente; Southern Taiwan University of Science & Technology
摘要：In the framework of (set-valued or single-valued) solutions for coalitional games with transferable utility, the three notions of consistency, bilateral consistency, and converse consistency are frequently used to provide axiomatic characterizations of a particular solution (like the core, prekernel, prenucleolus, Shapley value). Our main equivalence theorem claims that a solution satisfies consistency (with respect to an arbitrary reduced game) if and only if the solution satisfies both bilat...
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作者：Araujo, Aloisio; de Castro, Luciano I.
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; Instituto Nacional de Matematica Pura e Aplicada (IMPA); Getulio Vargas Foundation
摘要：We prove the existence of monotonic pure strategy equilibrium for many kinds of asymmetric auctions with n bidders and unitary demands, interdependent values and independent types. The assumptions require monotonicity only in the own bidder's type. The payments can be a function of all bids. Thus, we provide a new equilibrium existence result for asymmetrical double auctions and a small number of bidders. The generality of our setting requires the use of special tie-breaking rules. We present ...
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作者：Engelmann, Dirk; Fischbacher, Urs
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London; University of Konstanz; University of Copenhagen; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences
摘要：We study indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game. At any time only half of the subjects can build a reputation. This allows US to Study both pure indirect reciprocity that is not contaminated by strategic reputation building and the impact of incentives for strategic reputation building on the helping rate. We find that pure indirect reciprocity exists, but also that the helping decisions are substantially affected by strategic considerations. Fin...
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作者：Shellshear, Evan; Sudholter, Peter
作者单位：University of Southern Denmark; University of Bielefeld
摘要：If a TU game is extendable, then its core is a stable set. However, there are many TU games with a stable core that are not extendable. A coalition is vital if there exists some core element x such that none of the proper subcoalitions is effective for x. It is exact if it is effective for some core element. If all coalitions that are vital and exact are extendable, then the game has a stable core. It is shown that the contrary is also valid for matching games, for simple flow games, and for m...
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作者：Ashlagi, Itai; Monderer, Dov; Tennenholtz, Moshe
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; Harvard University; Microsoft; MICROSOFT ISRAEL
摘要：A mediator is a reliable entity which plays on behalf of the players who give her the right to play. The mediator acts in a pre-specified way based on messages received from the players. However, a mediator cannot enforce behavior; that is, players call play in the game directly without the mediator's help. A mediator generates a new game for the players, the mediated game. The outcome in the original game of an equilibrium in the mediated game is called a mediated equilibrium. Monderer and Te...
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作者：Sharma, Yogeshwer; Williamson, David P.
作者单位：Cornell University; Cornell University
摘要：It is well known that the Nash equilibrium in network routing games can have strictly higher cost than the optimum cost. In Stackelberg routing games, where a fraction of flow is centrally-controlled, a natural problem is to route the centrally-controlled flow such that the overall cost of the resulting equilibrium is minimized. We consider the scenario where the network administrator wants to know the minimum amount of centrally-controlled flow such that the cost of the resulting equilibrium ...
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作者：Hatfield, John William; Kojima, Fuhito
作者单位：Yale University; Stanford University
摘要：Hatfield and Milgrom [Hatfield, John William, Milgrom, Paul R., 2005. Matching with contracts. Amer. Econ. Rev. 95, 913-935] present a unified model of matching with contracts, which includes the standard two-sided matching and some package auction models as special cases. They show that the doctor-optimal stable mechanism is strategy-proof for doctors if hospitals' preferences satisfy substitutes and the law of aggregate demand. We show that the doctor-optimal stable mechanism is group strate...
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作者：Amir, Rabah; Bloch, Francis
作者单位：Aix-Marseille Universite; University of Arizona; University of Warwick
摘要：This paper investigates the effects of entry in two-sided markets where buyers and sellers act strategically. Applying new tools from supermodular optimization/games, Sufficient conditions for different comparative statics results are obtained. While normality of one good is Sufficient for the equilibrium price to be increasing in the number of buyers, normality of both goods is required for equilibrium bids and sellers' equilibrium utilities to be increasing in the number of buyers. When the ...
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作者：Azrieli, Yaron
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We study the efficiency of categorization of other agents as a way of saving cognitive resources in the settings of a large normal-form game. We assume that, when an agent categorizes (partitions) her opponents, she only has information about the average strategy in each category. A strategy profile is a conjectural categorical equilibrium (CCE) with respect to a given categorization profile if every player's strategy is a best response to some consistent conjecture about the strategies of her...
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作者：Guardiola, Luis A.; Meca, Ana; Puerto, Justo
作者单位：University of Sevilla; Universidad Miguel Hernandez de Elche
摘要：In this paper we introduce a new class of cooperative games that arise from production-inventory problems. Several agents have to cover their demand over a finite time horizon and shortages are allowed. Each agent has its own unit production, inventory-holding and backlogging cost. Cooperation among agents is given by sharing production processes and warehouse facilities: agents in a coalition produce with the cheapest production cost and store with the cheapest inventory cost. We prove that t...
