Feedback spillover and analogy-based expectations: A multi-game experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Huck, Steffen; Jehiel, Philippe; Rutter, Tom
• 署名单位: Paris School of Economics; University of London; University College London
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.06.007
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 351-365
• 关键词: Analogy-based expectation; Information processing; experiments; accessibility; Interactive learning; Feedback spillover

摘要

We consider a multi-game interactive learning environment in which subjects sometimes only have access to the aggregate distribution of play of the opponents over the various games and sometimes are told the joint distribution of actions and games in a more or less accessible way. Our main findings are: 1) In the presence of feedback spillover, long run behaviors stabilize to an analogy-based expectation equilibrium (Jehiel, 2005). 2) Faced with the same objective feedback, the long run behaviors are sometimes better described by Nash equilibrium and sometimes they are better described by the analogy-based expectation equilibrium depending on the accessibility of the feedback. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.