Voting blocs, party discipline and party formation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Eguia, Jon X.
• 署名单位: New York University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.01.004
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 111-135
• 关键词: Voting blocs; Party formation; Party discipline; coalition formation; Voting rule

摘要

I study the strategic incentives to coordinate votes in an assembly. Coalitions form voting blocs, acting as single players and affecting the policy outcome. In an assembly with two exogenous parties I show how the incentives to accept party discipline depend on the types of the agents, the sizes of the parties, and the rules the blocs use to aggregate preferences. In a game of fully endogenous party formation, I find sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibria with one bloc, two blocs, and multiple blocs. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.