Group strategyproofness in queueing models

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mitra, Manipushpak; Mutuswami, Suresh
• 署名单位: Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata; University of Leicester
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.06.011
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 242-254
• 关键词: Queueing models; Group strategyproofness; EFFICIENCY; No deficit

摘要

We identify and characterize a natural and intuitive class of mechanisms called the k-pivotal mechanisms. The axioms used are efficiency, pairwise strategyproofness, equal treatment of equals and weak linearity. We also identify the subclass of these mechanisms which do not run a budget deficit at all profiles and the mechanism which runs the least budget surplus. We also show that while k-pivotal mechanisms are also weak group strategyproof, strong group strategyproofness and efficiency are incompatible. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.