Auctions with flexible entry fees: A note

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Janssen, Maarten C. W.; Karamychev, Vladimir A.; Maasland, Emiel
• 署名单位: Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Tinbergen Institute; University of Vienna; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.10.005
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 594-601
• 关键词: Auctions; EFFICIENCY; entry fee; Negative externality; revenue

摘要

There is by now a large literature arguing that auctions with a variety of after-market interactions may not yield an efficient allocation of the objects for sale, especially when the bidders impose strong negative externalities upon each other. In this note, we argue that these inefficiencies can be avoided by asking bidders prior to the auction to submit any publicly observable payment they would like to make. These payments, so-called flexible entry fees, do not affect the allocation decision of the auctioneer. We show that auctions with flexible entry fees have a fully revealing equilibrium where bidders signal their type before the auction itself takes place. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.