Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in bargaining one-dimensional policies under (super) majority rules

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cardona, Daniel; Ponsati, Clara
• 署名单位: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Universitat de les Illes Balears; Barcelona School of Economics
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.01.006
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 65-75
• 关键词: One-dimensional bargaining; single-peaked preferences; Pareto optimality; Quota rules

摘要

We consider negotiations selecting one-dimensional policies. Individuals have instantaneous preferences represented by continuous, concave and single-peaked utility functions, and they are impatient. Decisions arise from a bargaining game with random proposers and (super) majority approval, ranging from the simple majority up to unanimity. We provide sufficient conditions that guarantee the existence of a unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium, and we provide its explicit characterization. The uniqueness of the equilibrium permits an analysis of the set of Pareto optimal voting rules. For symmetric distributions of peaks and uniform recognition probabilities unanimity is the unanimously preferred majority rule. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.