The reasoning-based expected utility procedure

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cubitt, Robin P.; Sugden, Robert
• 署名单位: University of Nottingham; University of East Anglia
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.04.002
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 328-338
• 关键词: Iterative solution procedures; Reasoning-based expected utility procedure; Iterative deletion

摘要

This paper presents a new iterative procedure for solving finite non-cooperative games, the reasoning-based expected utility procedure (RBEU), and compares this with existing iterative procedures. RBEU deletes more strategies than iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies, while avoiding the conceptual problems associated with iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies. It uses a sequence of accumulation and deletion operations to categorise strategies as permissible and impermissible; strategies may remain uncategorised when the procedure halts. RBEU and related categorisation procedures can be interpreted as tracking successive steps in players' own reasoning. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.