Minimum cost arborescences

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dutta, Bhaskar; Mishra, Debasis
• 署名单位: University of Warwick; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.007
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 120-143
• 关键词: Directed networks; cost allocation; core stability; continuity; Cost monotonicity

摘要

In this paper, we analyze the cost allocation problem when a group of agents or nodes have to be connected to a source, and where the cost matrix describing the cost of connecting each pair of agents is not necessarily symmetric, thus extending the well-studied problem of minimum cost spanning tree games, where the costs are assumed to be symmetric. The focus is on rules which satisfy axioms representing incentive and fairness properties. We show that while some results are similar, there are also significant differences between the frameworks corresponding to symmetric and asymmetric cost matrices. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.