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作者：Barmettler, Franziska; Fehr, Ernst; Zehnder, Christian
作者单位：University of Lausanne; University of Zurich
摘要：Researchers have demonstrated that the presence of people with social preferences has important economic implications. However, the empirical basis of this research relies to a large extent on experiments that do not provide anonymity between experimenter and subject. It has been argued that this lack of experimenter-subject anonymity may create selfish incentives to engage in seemingly other-regarding behavior. If this were the case, these experiments would overestimate the importance of soci...
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作者：Nieken, Petra; Schmitz, Patrick W.
作者单位：University of Bonn; University of Cologne; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：This paper reports data from a laboratory experiment on two-period moral hazard problems. The findings corroborate the contract-theoretic insight that even though the periods are technologically unrelated, due to incentive considerations principals can benefit from offering long-term contracts that exhibit memory. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Mak, Vincent; Rapoport, Amnon; Gisches, Eyran J.
作者单位：University of Cambridge; University of California System; University of California Riverside; University of Arizona
摘要：We propose an equilibrium model of duopolistic dynamic pricing in which a buyer alternates between two sellers for price offers over a finite time horizon. The game ends when the buyer accepts a price offer or the selling season is over, whichever comes first. Previous research (Granot et al,, 2007) shows that there are successive markdowns in equilibrium when the buyer is commonly known to be myopic; our analysis suggests that when she is known to be strategic price offers over the entire sel...
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作者：van den Brink, Rene
作者单位：Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute
摘要：In the literature various axiomatizations of the Shapley and Banzhaf value can be found where the only difference is the Shapley value satisfying efficiency and the Banzhaf value satisfying collusion neutrality. Both properties seem to be desirable. In this paper, we show that there is no solution satisfying efficiency, collusion neutrality and the null player property. After that we show that this impossibility is resolved when cooperation among players is restricted by a cycle-free communica...
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作者：Trudeau, Christian
作者单位：University of Windsor
摘要：Minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) problems try to connect agents efficiently to a source when agents are located at different points in space and the cost of using an edge is fixed. We introduce a new cost sharing solution that always selects a point in the core and that is more responsive to changes than the well-studied folk solution. The paper shows a sufficient condition for the concavity of the stand-alone cost game. Modifying the game to make sure the condition is satisfied and then taki...
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作者：Bracha, Anat; Brown, Donald J.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Boston; Yale University
摘要：Optimism bias is inconsistent with the independence of decision weights and payoffs found in models of choice under risk and uncertainty, such as expected utility theory, subjective expected utility, and prospect theory. We therefore propose an alternative model of risky and uncertain choice where decision weights-affective or perceived risk-are endogenous. Affective decision making (ADM) is a strategic model of choice under risk and uncertainty where we posit two cognitive processes the ratio...
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作者：Friedman, Eric J.
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：We describe the construction and analysis of asymmetric Cost Sharing mechanisms, in which a variety of axioms are applied to subsets of the agents/goods. We show that the analysis can be quite subtle as apparently similar axiomatizations lead to significantly different results; in particular, combinations of symmetric mechanisms can be extremely asymmetric and biased. In addition, we characterize some interesting mixed mechanisms. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Dobzinski, Shahar; Lavi, Ron; Nisan, Noam
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; Cornell University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated
摘要：We study multi-unit auctions for bidders that have a budget constraint, a situation very common in practice that has received relatively little attention in the auction theory literature. Our main result is an impossibility: there is no deterministic auction that (1) is individually rational and dominant-strategy incentive-compatible, (2) makes no positive transfers, and (3) always produces a Pareto optimal outcome. In contrast, we show that Ausubel's clinching auction satisfies all these prop...
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作者：Halpern, Joseph Y.; Pass, Rafael
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：For some well-known games, such as the Traveler's Dilemma or the Centipede Game, traditional game-theoretic solution concepts-most notably Nash equilibrium-predict outcomes that are not consistent with empirical observations. We introduce a new solution concept, iterated regret minimization, that exhibits the same qualitative behavior as that observed in experiments in many games of interest, including Traveler's Dilemma, the Centipede Game, Nash bargaining, and Bertrand competition. As the na...
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作者：van Veelen, Matthijs
作者单位：University of Amsterdam
摘要：Games that have no evolutionarily stable strategy may very well have neutrally stable ones. (Neutrally stable strategies are also known as weakly evolutionarily stable strategies.) Such neutrally, but not evolutionarily stable strategies can however still be relatively stable or unstable, depending on whether or not the neutral mutants it allows for - which by definition do not have a selective advantage themselves - can open doors for other mutants that do have a selective advantage. This pap...
