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作者：Bowen, T. Renee; Zahran, Zaki
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：Most legislatures require the consent of only a simple majority to pass a proposal, so why don't legislative outcomes favor only a bare majority? We show that compromise can be achieved if legislators are neither too impatient nor too patient, and initial allocations are not too unequal. The compromise is only sustainable if, starting from the unequal allocations there is a possibility of spiraling towards a complete absence of compromise. We find that the range of discount factors for which t...
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作者：Abreu, Dilip; Manea, Mihai
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Princeton University
摘要：We study the Markov perfect equilibria (MPEs) of an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players connected in a network are randomly matched to bargain. Players who reach agreement are removed from the network without replacement. We establish the existence of MPEs and show that MPE payoffs are not necessarily unique. A method for constructing pure strategy MPEs for high discount factors is developed. For some networks, we find that all MPEs are asymptotically inefficient as players become ...
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作者：Anbarci, Nejat; Feltovich, Nick
作者单位：Deakin University; Monash University
摘要：We use a laboratory experiment to study bargaining with random implementation. We modify the standard Nash demand game so that incompatible demands do not necessarily lead to the disagreement outcome. Rather, with exogenous probability q, one bargainer receives his/her demand, with the other getting the remainder. We use an asymmetric bargaining set (favouring one bargainer) and disagreement payoffs of zero, and we vary q over several values. Our results mostly support game theory's directiona...
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作者：Camera, Gabriele; Casari, Marco; Bigoni, Maria
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; University of Bologna
摘要：We study cooperation in economies of indefinite duration. Participants faced a sequence of prisoner's dilemmas with anonymous opponents. We identify and characterize the strategies employed at the individual level. We report that (i) grim trigger does not describe well individual play and there is wide heterogeneity in strategies; (ii) systematic defection does not crowd-out systematic cooperation; (iii) coordination on cooperative strategies does not improve with experience. We discuss altern...
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作者：Berninghaus, Siegfried K.; Ehrhart, Karl-Martin; Ott, Marion
作者单位：Helmholtz Association; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
摘要：We conduct an experiment in continuous time: every subject can change her links to others and her action in a Hawk-Dove game, which she plays bilaterally with each of her linked partners, at any time. We hypothesize that norms exist regarding who establishes and thus pays for links, and that players take these norms into account when deciding on their strategy. For such limitedly forward-looking players who consider others' linking reactions we introduce a strategy adaptation rule (Anticipator...
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作者：Colombo, Stefano
作者单位：Catholic University of the Sacred Heart
摘要：This comment points out the existence of flaws in the proof of the main proposition proposed by Fauli-Oller and Sandonis (2002) [Fauli-Oller, R., Sandonis, J., 2002: Welfare reducing licensing. Games Econ. Behav. 41, 192-205] and corrects them. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Perez-Castrillo, David; Querou, Nicolas
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS); Universite de Montpellier
摘要：We propose a smooth multibidding mechanism for environments where a group of agents have to choose one out of several projects. Our proposal is related to the multibidding mechanism (Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein, 2002) but it is smoother in the sense that small variations in an agent's bids do not lead to dramatic changes in the probability of selecting a project. This mechanism is shown to possess several interesting properties. First, the equilibrium outcome is unique. Second, it ensures an...
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作者：Cason, Timothy N.; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Zhang, Jingjing
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; Chapman University System; Chapman University; University of Zurich
摘要：Costless pre-play communication has been found to effectively facilitate coordination and enhance efficiency in games with Pareto-ranked equilibria. We report an experiment in which two groups compete in a weakest-link contest by expending costly efforts. Allowing intra-group communication leads to more aggressive competition and greater coordination than control treatments without any communication. On the other hand, allowing inter-group communication leads to less destructive competition. A...
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作者：Sano, Ryuji
作者单位：University of Osaka
摘要：This paper investigates the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in an ascending-price core-selecting auction, which is recently used in some countries' spectrum license auctions. We suppose that there are two identical items, two small bidders, and one large bidder. The small bidders demand only one unit of the item, whereas the large bidder wants both units. Package bidding ensures that the large bidder faces no exposure problem and behaves truthfully. However, one of the small bidders stops bidding...
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作者：Breitmoser, Yves
摘要：This paper analyzes strategic choice in p-beauty contests. First, I show that it is not generally a best reply to guess the expected target value, even in games with n > 2 players, and that iterated best response strictly applied does not induce a choice sequence approximating p(k) . 0.5. Second, I argue that the beliefs and actions of players typically considered to be level 2-4 are intuitively captured also by high-level concepts such as quantal response equilibrium and noisy introspection. ...
