Coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: Theory and application

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Okada, Akira
• 署名单位: Hitotsubashi University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.01.008
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 227-235
• 关键词: Non-cooperative coalitional bargaining; Random proposers; Nash bargaining solution; Wage bargaining; core

摘要

We consider a non-cooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers in a general situation for which players differ in recognition probability and time preference. We characterize an efficient equilibrium as the generalized Nash bargaining solution that belongs to the core. The model is applied to wage bargaining between an employer and multiple workers. Although involuntary unemployment may occur in equilibrium, full employment emerges as players become sufficiently patient. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.