Deconstruction and reconstruction of an anomaly

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Engelmann, Dirk; Strobel, Martin
• 署名单位: University of Mannheim; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; University of Copenhagen; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Maastricht University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.07.009
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 678-689
• 关键词: Anomalies; false consensus; Information processing; Experimental economics

摘要

We present a striking example of the deconstruction and reconstruction of an anomaly. In line with previous experiments we show in a one-shot setting that the allegedly robust false consensus effect disappears if representative information is readily available. But the effect reappears if a small cognitive effort is required to retrieve the information. Most subjects apparently ignore valuable information if it is not handed to them on a silver platter. We conclude that the relevance of the false consensus effect depends on the difficulty of retrieving the information and that the underlying mechanism is an information processing deficiency rather than egocentricity. Moreover, we discuss the potential relevance of our findings for other well-known effects like the winner's curse and overconfidence. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.