Dominant strategy implementation of stable rules

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kumano, Taro; Watabe, Masahiro
• 署名单位: Washington University (WUSTL); Zirve University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.11.008
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 428-434
• 关键词: Deferred acceptance algorithm; Dominant strategy implementation; STABILITY; Weak nonbossiness; multiple equilibria

摘要

Most priority-based assignment problems are solved using the deferred acceptance algorithm. Kojima (2010) shows that stability and nonbossiness are incompatible. We show that the deferred acceptance algorithm satisfies a weaker notion of nonbossiness for every substitutable priority structure. We also discuss the multiplicity of dominant strategy equilibria of the preference revelation game induced by the deferred acceptance algorithm. We show that even untruthful dominant strategy equilibria lead to the truthful equilibrium outcome. In other words, the deferred acceptance algorithm is dominant strategy implementable. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.