Markov equilibria in a model of bargaining in networks

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Abreu, Dilip; Manea, Mihai
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Princeton University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.09.004
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 1-16
• 关键词: Bargaining; decentralized markets; Equilibrium existence; INEFFICIENCY; Markov perfect equilibrium; networks; Random matching

摘要

We study the Markov perfect equilibria (MPEs) of an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players connected in a network are randomly matched to bargain. Players who reach agreement are removed from the network without replacement. We establish the existence of MPEs and show that MPE payoffs are not necessarily unique. A method for constructing pure strategy MPEs for high discount factors is developed. For some networks, we find that all MPEs are asymptotically inefficient as players become patient. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.