-
作者：Lopez-Pintado, Dunia
作者单位：Universidad Pablo de Olavide; Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：Some behaviors, ideas or technologies spread and become persistent in society, whereas others vanish. This paper analyzes the role of social influence in determining such distinct collective outcomes. Agents are assumed to acquire information from others through a certain sampling process, that generates an influence network, and they use simple rules to decide whether to adopt or not depending on the behavior of the observed sample. We characterize, as a function of the primitives of the mode...
-
作者：Staudigl, Mathias
作者单位：University of Bielefeld
摘要：A recent literature in evolutionary game theory is devoted to the question of robust equilibrium selection under noisy best-response dynamics. In this paper we present a complete picture of equilibrium selection for asymmetric binary choice coordination games in the small noise limit. We achieve this by transforming the stochastic stability analysis into an optimal control problem, which can be solved analytically. This approach allows us to obtain precise and clean equilibrium selection resul...
-
作者：McEvily, Bill; Radzevick, Joseph R.; Weber, Roberto A.
作者单位：University of Zurich; University of Toronto; Gettysburg College
摘要：We advance the measurement of trust in economics in two ways. First, we highlight the importance of clearly identifying the target of trust, particularly for obtaining concordance between attitudinal and behavioral measures of trust. Second, we introduce a novel behavioral measure of (dis)trust, based on individuals' willingness to pay to avoid being vulnerable to the target of trust. We conduct an experiment in which we vary the target of trust among passersby at several locations around a ci...
-
作者：Lebrun, Bernard
作者单位：York University - Canada
摘要：In the presence of resale and under more general assumptions than Zheng's (2002), implementation of Myerson's (1981) optimal allocation with two bidders is achieved through the second-price auction. In a special class of asymmetric n-bidder models. it is achieved through the English auction. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Mengel, Friederike
作者单位：University of Nottingham; Maastricht University
摘要：This paper studies the learning process carried out by two agents who are involved in many games. As distinguishing all games can be too costly (require too much reasoning resources) agents might partition the set of all games into categories. Partitions of higher cardinality are more costly. A process of simultaneous learning of actions and partitions is presented and equilibrium partitions and action choices characterized. Learning across games can destabilize strict Nash equilibria even for...
-
作者：Heller, Yuval
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Oxford
摘要：Most existing decision-making models assume that choice behavior is based on preference maximization even when the preferences are incomplete. In this paper we study an alternative approach - justifiable choice: each agent has several preference relations (justifications), and she can use each justification in every choice problem. We present a new behavioral property that requires an alternative to be chosen if it is not inferior to all mixtures of chosen alternatives, and show that this prop...
-
作者：Jadbabaie, Ali; Molavi, Pooya; Sandroni, Alvaro; Tahbaz-Salehi, Alireza
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Pennsylvania; Columbia University
摘要：We develop a dynamic model of opinion formation in social networks when the information required for learning a parameter may not be at the disposal of any single agent. Individuals engage in communication with their neighbors in order to learn from their experiences. However, instead of incorporating the views of their neighbors in a fully Bayesian manner, agents use a simple updating rule which linearly combines their personal experience and the views of their neighbors. We show that, as lon...
-
作者：Hummel, Patrick
作者单位：Yahoo! Inc
摘要：This paper introduces a model of electoral competition in which candidates select policies and voters are then exposed to arguments in favor of the policies. Voters update their beliefs about their own private preferences after listening to arguments and then vote in the election. I show that candidates adopt more divergent policies when voters are exposed to more arguments before the election. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Hernandez, Penelope; Urbano, Amparo; Vila, Jose E.
作者单位：University of Valencia; University of Valencia
摘要：This paper constructs the equilibrium for a specific code that can be seen as a universal grammar in a class of common interest Sender-Receiver games where players communicate through a noisy channel. We propose a Sender's signaling strategy which does not depend on either the game payoffs or the initial probability distribution. The Receiver's strategy partitions the set of possible sequences into subsets, with a single action assignment to each of them. The Sender's signaling strategy is a N...
-
作者：Daley, Brendan; Schwarz, Michael; Sonin, Konstantin
作者单位：Duke University; New Economic School
摘要：We analyze an environment in which bidders' private values change over time due to both private investments and exogenous shocks. We demonstrate that a highly-decentralized mechanism achieves efficiency. The mechanism requires a stage of costly public announcements (i.e., signaling) to induce efficient investment. For this reason, an equilibrium selection issue arises, but can be handled by a minor modification in the spirit of virtual implementation. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
