Cooperative strategies in anonymous economies: An experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Camera, Gabriele; Casari, Marco; Bigoni, Maria
• 署名单位: Purdue University System; Purdue University; University of Bologna
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.009
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 570-586
• 关键词: Folk theorem; repeated games; equilibrium selection; Finite automata; Social dilemma; Random matching

摘要

We study cooperation in economies of indefinite duration. Participants faced a sequence of prisoner's dilemmas with anonymous opponents. We identify and characterize the strategies employed at the individual level. We report that (i) grim trigger does not describe well individual play and there is wide heterogeneity in strategies; (ii) systematic defection does not crowd-out systematic cooperation; (iii) coordination on cooperative strategies does not improve with experience. We discuss alternative methodologies and implications for theory. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.