-
作者：Benchekroun, Hassan; Withagen, Cees
作者单位：McGill University; Universite de Montreal; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
摘要：We consider a nonrenewable resource game with one cartel and a set of fringe members. We show that (i) the outcomes of the closed-loop and the open-loop nonrenewable resource game with the fringe members as price takers (the cartel-fringe game a la Salant, 1976) coincide and (ii) when the number of fringe firms becomes arbitrarily large, the equilibrium outcome of the closed-loop Nash game does not coincide with the equilibrium outcome of the closed-loop cartel-fringe game. Thus, the outcome o...
-
作者：Non, Arjan
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Tinbergen Institute
摘要：By incorporating reciprocity in an otherwise standard principal-agent model, I investigate the relation between monetary gift-exchange and incentive pay, while allowing for worker heterogeneity. I assume that some, but not all, workers care more for their principal when they are convinced that the principal cares for them. The principal can be egoistic or altruistic. Absent worker heterogeneity, an altruistic principal signals his altruism by offering relatively weak incentives and a relativel...
-
作者：Bednar, Jenna; Chen, Yan; Liu, Tracy Xiao; Page, Scott
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; The Santa Fe Institute; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：We present evidence from laboratory experiments of behavioral spillovers and cognitive load that spread across strategic contexts. In the experiments, subjects play two distinct games simultaneously with different opponents. We find that the strategies chosen and the efficiency of outcomes in one game depends on the other game that the subject plays, and that play is altered in predictable directions. We develop a measure of behavioral variation in a normal form game, outcome entropy, and find...
-
作者：Koenig, Michael D.; Battiston, Stefano; Napoletano, Mauro; Schweitzer, Frank
作者单位：Stanford University; Stanford University; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; Universite Cote d'Azur; SKEMA Business School
摘要：We investigate the efficiency and stability of R&D networks in a model with network-dependent indirect spillovers. We show that the efficient network structure critically depends on the marginal cost of R&D collaborations. When the marginal cost is low, the complete graph is efficient, while high marginal costs imply that the efficient network is asymmetric and has a nested structure. Regarding the stability of network structures, we show the existence of both symmetric and asymmetric equilibr...
-
作者：Brocas, Isabelle; Carrillo, Juan D.
作者单位：University of Southern California
摘要：We build on research from neurobiology to model the process through which the brain maps outside evidence into decisions. The sensory system encodes information through cell-firing. Cell-firing is measured against a threshold, and an action is triggered depending on whether the threshold is surpassed. The decision system modulates the threshold. We show that the (constrained) optimal threshold is set in a way that existing beliefs are likely to be confirmed. We then derive behavioral implicati...
-
作者：Mishra, Debasis; Sen, Arunava
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
摘要：We consider dominant strategy implementation in private values settings, when agents have multi-dimensional types, the set of alternatives is finite, monetary transfers are allowed, and agents have quasi-linear utilities. We focus on private-value environments. We show that any implementable and neutral social choice function must be a weighted welfare maximizer if the type space of every agent is an m-dimensional open interval, where 111 is the number of alternatives. When the type space of e...
-
作者：Condorelli, Daniele
作者单位：University of Essex
摘要：I study the ex-ante efficient allocation of a set of quality-heterogeneous objects to a number of heterogeneous risk-neutral agents. Agents have independent private values, which represent the maximum cost they are willing to sustain to obtain an object of unitary quality. The designer faces a trade-off between allocative efficiency and cost of screening, because the cost sustained is wasted. The optimal mechanism ranks agents based on their marginal contribution to social surplus and distribu...
-
作者：Schmitz, Patrick W.; Troeger, Thomas
作者单位：University of Mannheim; University of Cologne; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We consider collective choice from two alternatives. Ex-ante, each agent is uncertain about which alternative she prefers, and may be uncertain about the intensity of her preferences. An environment is given by a probability distribution over utility vectors that is symmetric across agents and neutral across alternatives. In many environments, the majority voting rule maximizes agents' ex-ante expected utilities among all anonymous and dominant-strategy implementable choice rules. But in some ...
-
作者：Bell, Clive; Gersbach, Hans; Schneider, Maik T.
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg
摘要：This paper investigates how families decide how juveniles use their time. The problem is analyzed in three variations: (i) a 'decentralized' scheme, in which parents control the main budget, but their children dispose of their time as they see fit, together with any earnings from work on their own account: (ii) 'hierarchy', in which parents can enforce, at some cost, particular levels of schooling and supervised work contributing to the main budget; and (iii) the cooperative solution, in which...
-
作者：Mishra, Debasis; Roy, Souvik
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata; Universite de Caen Normandie
摘要：We consider the problem of choosing a partition of a set of objects by a set of agents. The private information of each agent is a strict ordering over the set of partitions of the objects. A social choice function chooses a partition given the reported preferences of the agents. We impose a natural restriction on the allowable set of strict orderings over the set of partitions, which we call an intermediate domain. Our main result is a complete characterization of strategy-proof and tops-only...
