Non-bidding equilibrium in an ascending core-selecting auction

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sano, Ryuji
• 署名单位: University of Osaka
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.016
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 637-650
• 关键词: Auctions; Core-selecting auction; Ascending auction; Package clock auction; free-rider problem

摘要

This paper investigates the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in an ascending-price core-selecting auction, which is recently used in some countries' spectrum license auctions. We suppose that there are two identical items, two small bidders, and one large bidder. The small bidders demand only one unit of the item, whereas the large bidder wants both units. Package bidding ensures that the large bidder faces no exposure problem and behaves truthfully. However, one of the small bidders stops bidding at the beginning in the equilibrium. Although small bidders generally face the free-rider problem and have incentives to underbid, once a bidder is the only small one remaining, he bids truthfully. Stopping early induces the remaining bidder to behave truthfully. Hence, each small bidder wants to be the first to stop bidding. The free-rider problem is considerably mitigated when there are many small bidders. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.