On dynamic compromise

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bowen, T. Renee; Zahran, Zaki
• 署名单位: Stanford University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.06.009
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 391-419
• 关键词: Compromise; Dynamic legislative bargaining; Markov equilibria

摘要

Most legislatures require the consent of only a simple majority to pass a proposal, so why don't legislative outcomes favor only a bare majority? We show that compromise can be achieved if legislators are neither too impatient nor too patient, and initial allocations are not too unequal. The compromise is only sustainable if, starting from the unequal allocations there is a possibility of spiraling towards a complete absence of compromise. We find that the range of discount factors for which the equilibrium exists increases as the number of legislators increases. In this sense, compromise is easier in larger legislatures. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.