Strategic reasoning in p-beauty contests

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Breitmoser, Yves
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.010
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 555-569
• 关键词: Beauty contest; Logic equilibrium; Noisy introspection; Level-k

摘要

This paper analyzes strategic choice in p-beauty contests. First, I show that it is not generally a best reply to guess the expected target value, even in games with n > 2 players, and that iterated best response strictly applied does not induce a choice sequence approximating p(k) . 0.5. Second, I argue that the beliefs and actions of players typically considered to be level 2-4 are intuitively captured also by high-level concepts such as quantal response equilibrium and noisy introspection. Third, I analyze this hypothesis econometrically. The results concur. In six different data sets, the choices are described more adequately as mixtures of quantal response equilibrium and noisy introspection than as level-k mixtures. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.