Smooth multibidding mechanisms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Perez-Castrillo, David; Querou, Nicolas
• 署名单位: Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS); Universite de Montpellier
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.07.003
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 420-438
• 关键词: Mechanism design; NIMBY

摘要

We propose a smooth multibidding mechanism for environments where a group of agents have to choose one out of several projects. Our proposal is related to the multibidding mechanism (Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein, 2002) but it is smoother in the sense that small variations in an agent's bids do not lead to dramatic changes in the probability of selecting a project. This mechanism is shown to possess several interesting properties. First, the equilibrium outcome is unique. Second, it ensures an equal sharing of the surplus that it induces. Finally, it enables reaching an outcome as close to efficiency as is desired. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.