Pragmatic languages with universal grammars

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hernandez, Penelope; Urbano, Amparo; Vila, Jose E.
• 署名单位: University of Valencia; University of Valencia
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.08.009
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 738-752
• 关键词: Signaling game; Block-coding strategy; Separating equilibria

摘要

This paper constructs the equilibrium for a specific code that can be seen as a universal grammar in a class of common interest Sender-Receiver games where players communicate through a noisy channel. We propose a Sender's signaling strategy which does not depend on either the game payoffs or the initial probability distribution. The Receiver's strategy partitions the set of possible sequences into subsets, with a single action assignment to each of them. The Sender's signaling strategy is a Nash equilibrium, i.e. when the Receiver responds best to the Sender's strategy, the Sender has no incentive to deviate. An example shows that a tie-breaking decoding is crucial for the block-coding strategy to be an equilibrium. Efficiency is analyzed by comparing how close ex-ante expected payoffs are to those of noiseless communication. Moreover, we study how long communication should be to achieve a given payoff-approximation. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.