Optimality and the English and second-price auctions with resale

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lebrun, Bernard
• 署名单位: York University - Canada
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.03.007
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 731-751
• 关键词: optimality; resale; Second-price auction; English auction; Heterogeneous bidders; EFFICIENCY; Behavioral bidding strategies; No-regret property; multiplicity of equilibria

摘要

In the presence of resale and under more general assumptions than Zheng's (2002), implementation of Myerson's (1981) optimal allocation with two bidders is achieved through the second-price auction. In a special class of asymmetric n-bidder models. it is achieved through the English auction. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.