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作者：Aoyagi, Masaki
作者单位：University of Osaka
摘要：A monopolist sells a good whose value depends on the number of buyers who adopt it as well as on their private types. The seller coordinates the buyers' adoption decisions based on their reported types, and charges them the price based on the number of adoptions. We study ex post implementable sales schemes that are collusion-proof, and show that under the revenue maximizing scheme, more buyer types are willing to adopt when there are more adoptions, and the number of adoptions is maximized su...
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作者：Barelli, Paulo; Galanis, Spyros
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Southampton
摘要：We develop an approach to providing epistemic conditions for admissible behavior in games. Instead of using lexicographic beliefs to capture infinitely less likely conjectures, we postulate that players use tie-breaking sets to help decide among strategies that are outcome-equivalent given their conjectures. A player is event-rational if she best responds to a conjecture and uses a list of subsets of the other players' strategies to break ties among outcome-equivalent strategies. Using type sp...
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作者：Rivas, Javier
作者单位：University of Leicester
摘要：We study a setting in which imitative players are matched into pairs to play a Prisoner's Dilemma game. A well-known result in such setting is that under random matching cooperation vanishes for any interior initial condition. The novelty of this paper is that we consider partial rematching: players that belong to a pair in which both parties cooperate repeat partner next period, while all other players are randomly matched into pairs. Under certain conditions, this rematching mechanism makes ...
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作者：Chen, Yiling; Lai, John K.; Parkes, David C.; Procaccia, Ariel D.
作者单位：Harvard University; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：Cake cutting is a common metaphor for the division of a heterogeneous divisible good. There are numerous papers that study the problem of fairly dividing a cake; a small number of them also take into account self-interested agents and consequent strategic issues, but these papers focus on fairness and consider a strikingly weak notion of truthfulness. In this paper we investigate the problem of cutting a cake in a way that is truthful, Pareto-efficient, and fair, where for the first time our n...
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作者：Reuben, Ernesto; Riedl, Arno
作者单位：IZA Institute Labor Economics; Columbia University; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Tilburg University; Maastricht University
摘要：We investigate the emergence and enforcement of contribution norms to public goods in homogeneous and heterogeneous groups. With survey data we demonstrate that uninvolved individuals hold well defined yet conflicting normative views of fair contribution rules related to efficiency, equality, and equity. In the experiment, in the absence of punishment no positive contribution norm is observed and all groups converge towards free-riding. With punishment, strong and stable differences in contrib...
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作者：Pancs, Romans
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：Negotiations about a merger or acquisition are often sequential and only partially disclose to bidders information about each other's bids. This paper explains the seller optimality of partial disclosure in a single-item private-value auction with two bidders. Each bidder can inspect the item at a nonprohibitive cost. If a revenue-maximizing seller cannot charge bidders for the information about the other's bid, then the seller optimally runs a sequential second-price auction with a reserve pr...
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作者：Athanasiou, Efthymios
作者单位：New Economic School
摘要：A benevolent Planner wishes to assign an indivisible private good to n claimants, each valuing the object differently. Individuals have quasi-linear preferences. Therefore, the possibility of transfers is allowed. A second-best efficient mechanism is a strategy-proof and anonymous mechanism that is not Pareto dominated by another strategy-proof and anonymous mechanism. In this context, we identify three conditions that are necessary and, together with Voluntary Participation, sufficient for a ...
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作者：Bilancini, Ennio; Boncinelli, Leonardo
作者单位：Universita di Modena e Reggio Emilia; University of Pisa
摘要：We present a model of two-sided matching where utility is non-transferable and information about individuals' skills is private, utilities are strictly increasing in the partner's skill and satisfy increasing differences. Skills can be either revealed or kept hidden, but while agents on one side have verifiable skills, agents on the other side have skills that are unverifiable unless certified, and certification is costly. Agents who have revealed their skill enter a standard matching market, ...
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作者：Beal, Sylvain; Remila, Eric; Solal, Philippe
作者单位：Universite Marie et Louis Pasteur; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS); Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Universite Claude Bernard Lyon 1; Universite Jean Monnet; Universite Lyon 2
摘要：We show that the core of any n-player TU-game with a non-empty core can be accessed with at most n - 1 blocks. It turns out that this bound is optimal in the sense there are TU-games for which the number of blocks required to access the core is exactly n - 1. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Blumrosen, Liad; Feldman, Michal
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：While traditional mechanism design typically assumes isomorphism between the type space of the players and their action space, behavioral, technical or regulatory factors can severely restrict the set of actions that are actually available to players. We study single-parameter mechanism-design problems in environments with restricted action spaces. In our first main result, we provide sufficient conditions under which the information-theoretically optimal solution can be implemented in equilib...
