Efficient investment in a dynamic auction environment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Daley, Brendan; Schwarz, Michael; Sonin, Konstantin
• 署名单位: Duke University; New Economic School
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.11.006
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 104-119
• 关键词: Auctions; Efficient mechanism design; signaling

摘要

We analyze an environment in which bidders' private values change over time due to both private investments and exogenous shocks. We demonstrate that a highly-decentralized mechanism achieves efficiency. The mechanism requires a stage of costly public announcements (i.e., signaling) to induce efficient investment. For this reason, an equilibrium selection issue arises, but can be handled by a minor modification in the spirit of virtual implementation. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.