Stochastic stability in asymmetric binary choice coordination games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Staudigl, Mathias
• 署名单位: University of Bielefeld
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.11.003
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 372-401
• 关键词: Evolutionary game theory; stochastic stability; equilibrium selection

摘要

A recent literature in evolutionary game theory is devoted to the question of robust equilibrium selection under noisy best-response dynamics. In this paper we present a complete picture of equilibrium selection for asymmetric binary choice coordination games in the small noise limit. We achieve this by transforming the stochastic stability analysis into an optimal control problem, which can be solved analytically. This approach allows us to obtain precise and clean equilibrium selection results for all canonical noisy best-response dynamics which have been proposed so far in the literature, among which we find the best-response with mutations dynamics, the logit dynamics and the probit dynamics. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.