Deliberative democracy and electoral competition

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hummel, Patrick
• 署名单位: Yahoo! Inc
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.004
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 646-667
• 关键词: Deliberation; ELECTIONS; learning; Policy selection

摘要

This paper introduces a model of electoral competition in which candidates select policies and voters are then exposed to arguments in favor of the policies. Voters update their beliefs about their own private preferences after listening to arguments and then vote in the election. I show that candidates adopt more divergent policies when voters are exposed to more arguments before the election. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.