-
作者：Mackenzie, Andrew
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：A prize is to be awarded, so each candidate designates one of his peers on a ballot. The ballots determine the lottery that selects the winner, and impartiality requires that no candidate's choice of designee impacts his own chance of winning, removing incentives for strategic ballot submission. The primary results are (1) a characterization of all impartial rules that treat agents symmetrically as voters, and (2) a characterization of all impartial rules that treat agents symmetrically as can...
-
作者：Abhishek, Vineet; Hajek, Bruce; Williams, Steven R.
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：DeMarzo et al. (2005) consider auctions in which bids are selected from a completely ordered family of securities whose values are tied to the resource being auctioned. The paper defines a notion of relative steepness of families of securities and shows that a steeper family provides greater expected revenue to the seller. Two assumptions are: the buyers are risk neutral; the random variables through which values and signals of the buyers are realized are affiliated. We show that this revenue ...
-
作者：Phelan, Christopher; Skrzypacz, Andrzej
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; Stanford University
摘要：For a general class of games with private monitoring we show for any finite state strategy (or automaton strategy) with D-i states for players i is an element of {1,..., N}, if there exists a number of periods t such that it is possible on-path to reach any joint state from any joint state in t periods, the strategy is a strict correlated equilibrium only if each player's strategy is a function only of what the player observes in the last D-i - 1 periods. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights rese...
-
作者：Dutcher, E. Glenn; Balafoutas, Loukas; Lindner, Florian; Ryvkin, Dmitry; Sutter, Matthias
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio University; University of Innsbruck; State University System of Florida; Florida State University; University of Cologne
摘要：We utilize a laboratory experiment to compare effort provision under optimal tournament contracts with different distributions of prizes which motivate agents to compete to be first, avoid being last, or both. We find that the combined tournament contract incorporating both incentives at the top and at the bottom induces the highest effort, especially in larger groups. Avoiding being last produces the lowest variance of effort and is more effective at motivating employees compared to competing...
-
作者：Kalandrakis, Tasos
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：Computation of exact equilibrium values for n-player divide-the-dollar legislative bargaining games as in Baron and Ferejohn (1989) with general quota voting rules, recognition probabilities, and discount factors, can be achieved by solving at most n bivariate square linear systems of equations. The approach recovers Eraslan's (2002) uniqueness result and relies on a characterization of equilibria in terms of two variables that satisfy a pair of piecewise linear equations. (C) 2015 Elsevier In...
-
作者：Faravelli, Marco; Man, Priscilla; Walsh, Randall
作者单位：University of Queensland; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We propose a game theoretic costly voting model of large elections that incorporates the assumption that mandate matters. This innovation is motivated by empirical evidence that US Representatives with larger victory margins on average vote in a more partisan manner. If voters are paternalistic, this new model predicts strictly positive limiting turnout rates as the population grows arbitrarily large. The model also preserves stylized comparative statics results of costly voting models, includ...
-
作者：Cai, Yang; Daskalakis, Constantinos
作者单位：McGill University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We provide near-optimal, polynomial-time algorithms for pricing n items to optimize revenue against a unit-demand buyer whose values are independent from known distributions. For any chosen is an element of > 0 and values in [0,1], our algorithm's revenue is optimal up to an additive is an element of. For values sampled from monotone hazard rate (MHR) or regular distributions, we achieve a (1- is an element of)-fraction of the optimal revenue in polynomial time and quasi-polynomial time, respe...
-
作者：Halpern, Joseph Y.; Kets, Willemien
作者单位：Cornell University; Northwestern University
摘要：Standard economic models cannot capture the fact that information is often ambiguous, and is interpreted in multiple ways. Using a framework that distinguishes between the language in which statements are made and the interpretation of statements, we demonstrate that, unlike in the case where there is no ambiguity, players may come to have different beliefs starting from a common prior, even if they have received exactly the same information, unless the information is common knowledge. (C) 201...
-
作者：Arieli, Itai; Levy, Yehuda John
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; University of Oxford; University of Oxford; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We consider an infinite two-player stochastic zero-sum game with a Borel winning set, in which the opponent's actions are monitored via stochastic private signals. We introduce two conditions of the signalling structure: Stochastic Eventual Perfect Monitoring (SEPM) and Weak Stochastic Eventual Perfect Monitoring (WSEPM). When signals are deterministic these two conditions coincide and by a recent result due to Shmaya (2011) entail determinacy of the game. We generalize Shmaya's (2011) result ...
-
作者：Wang, Cheng; Yang, Youzhi
作者单位：Fudan University; Iowa State University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：We study a dynamic principal agent relationship where a stochastic outside opportunity (offer) arises each period for the risk averse agent. Termination is costly, but it allows the agent to pursue the available outside opportunity and the principal to return to an external market to hire a new agent. The principal acts strategically with respect to the agent's outside offers and we show that it is optimal to terminate the current relationship if and only if the agent's outside offer is above ...
