Recall and private monitoring

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Phelan, Christopher; Skrzypacz, Andrzej
• 署名单位: National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.02.010
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 162-170
• 关键词: Repeated games; private monitoring

摘要

For a general class of games with private monitoring we show for any finite state strategy (or automaton strategy) with D-i states for players i is an element of {1,..., N}, if there exists a number of periods t such that it is possible on-path to reach any joint state from any joint state in t periods, the strategy is a strict correlated equilibrium only if each player's strategy is a function only of what the player observes in the last D-i - 1 periods. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.