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作者：Lai, Ernest K.; Lim, Wooyoung; Wang, Joseph Tao-yi
作者单位：Lehigh University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; National Taiwan University
摘要：We design experimental games that capture the logic of Battaglini's (2002) construction of fully revealing equilibrium in multidimensional cheap talk. Two senders transmit information to a receiver over a 2 x 2 state space. Despite overall misaligned interests, full revelation is achieved in equilibrium by having the senders truthfully reveal along distinct dimensions. Our experimental findings confirm that more information can be extracted with two senders in a multidimensional setting. The e...
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作者：Naroditskiy, Victor; Steinberg, Richard
作者单位：University of Southampton; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：It is well known that efficient use of congestible resources can be achieved via marginal pricing; however, payments collected from the agents generate a budget surplus, which reduces social welfare. We show that an asymptotically first-best solution in the number of agents can be achieved by the appropriate redistribution of the budget surplus back to the agents. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Bhaskar, Umang; Fleischer, Lisa; Anshelevich, Elliot
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Dartmouth College; Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
摘要：Routing games are studied to understand the impact of individual users' decisions on network efficiency. Most prior work on efficiency in routing games uses a simplified model where all flows exist simultaneously, and users care about either their maximum delay or their total delay. Both these measures are surrogates for measuring how long it takes to get all of a user's traffic through the network. We attempt a more direct study of network efficiency by examining routing games in a flow over ...
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作者：Daskalakis, Constantinos; Deckelbaum, Alan; Kim, Anthony
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Stanford University
摘要：We propose a new no-regret learning algorithm. When used against an adversary, our algorithm achieves average regret that scales optimally as 0 (1/root T) with the number T of rounds. However, when our algorithm is used by both players of a zero-sum game, their average regret scales as 0 (In T/T), guaranteeing a near-linear rate of convergence to the value of the game. This repreSents an almost-quadratic improvement on the rate of convergence to the value of a zero-sum game known to be achieva...
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作者：Hilbe, Christian; Traulsen, Arne; Sigmund, Karl
作者单位：Harvard University; Max Planck Society; University of Vienna; International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA)
摘要：Within the class of memory-one strategies for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, we characterize partner strategies, competitive strategies and zero-determinant strategies. If a player uses a partner strategy, both players can fairly share the social optimum; but a co-player preferring an unfair solution will be penalized by obtaining a reduced payoff. A player using a competitive strategy never obtains less than the co-player. A player using a zero-determinant strategy unilaterally enforces a l...
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作者：Dobzinski, Shahar; Fu, Hu; Kleinberg, Robert
作者单位：Weizmann Institute of Science; Cornell University
摘要：We consider the design of dominant strategy incentive compatible, revenue-maximizing auctions for an indivisible good, when bidders' values are drawn from a correlated distribution. For independent distributions, Myerson showed that the optimal auction for risk-neutral bidders remains incentive compatible regardless of bidders' risk attitudes. We show that, for correlated distributions, the same is true when only two bidders are involved, whereas for more bidders, randomization can generate st...
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作者：Van Essen, Matt; Wooders, John
作者单位：University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa; University of Technology Sydney
摘要：We explore the role of experience in mixed-strategy games by comparing, for a stylized version of Texas Hold-em, the behavior of experts, who have extensive experience playing poker online, to the behavior of novices. We find significant differences. The initial frequencies with which players bet and call are closer to equilibrium for experts than novices. And, while the betting and calling frequencies of both types of subjects exhibit too much heterogeneity to be consistent with equilibrium p...
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作者：John, Katrin; Thomsen, Stephan L.
作者单位：Leibniz University Hannover; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW); IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要：Using data from dictator (DG) and public goods (PGG) game experiments run in classrooms with German pupils (ages 10-16) we analyze the differences in other-regarding behavior across two distinct school tracks which are entered at age 10. We find that pupils in the academic track give more and choose the equal split more often than pupils in the vocational track in the DG, but there are no robust track differences in the PGG. Selection into tracks results in differences in IQ, in personality an...
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作者：Bindel, David; Kleinberg, Jon; Oren, Sigal
作者单位：Cornell University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：The question of how people form their opinion has fascinated economists and sociologists for long time. In many of the models, a group of people in a social network, each holding a numerical opinion, arrive at a shared opinion through repeated averaging with their neighbors in the network. Motivated by the observation that in reality consensus is rarely reached, we study a related sociological model in which individuals' intrinsic beliefs counterbalance the averaging process and yield a divers...
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作者：Szech, Nora
作者单位：Helmholtz Association; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
摘要：We revisit the two bidder complete information all-pay auction with bid-caps introduced by Che and Gale (1998), dropping their assumption that tie-breaking must be symmetric. Any choice of tie-breaking rule leads to a different set of Nash equilibria. Compared to the optimal bid-cap of Che and Gale we obtain that in order to maximize the sum of bids, the designer prefers to set a less restrictive bid-cap combined with a tie-breaking rule which slightly favors the weaker bidder. Moreover, the d...
