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作者：He, Wei; Li, Jiangtao
作者单位：Chinese University of Hong Kong; National University of Singapore
摘要：This paper considers a dynamic environment with interdependent valuations and evolving private information. Under the assumption of independent types, we construct an efficient, incentive-compatible mechanism that is also budget-balanced in every period of the game. Our mechanism works in environments where in each period, each agent observes her own realized outcome-decision payoff from the previous period. This extends the insight of Mezzetti (2004) to the dynamic setting. (C) 2016 Elsevier ...
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作者：Minozzi, William; Woon, Jonathan
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：We conduct a game-theoretic laboratory experiment to investigate the nature of information transmission in a communication environment featuring competition and information asymmetry. Two senders have private information about their preferences and simultaneously send messages to a receiver in a one-dimensional space with a large number of states, actions, and messages. We find that equilibrium predictions fare poorly and that senders overcommunicate by consistently exaggerating their messages...
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作者：Chawla, Shuchi; Fleischer, Lisa; Hartline, Jason; Roughgarden, Tim
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作者：Cole, Richard; Correa, Jose R.; Gkatzelis, Vasilis; Mirrokni, Vahab; Olver, Neil
作者单位：New York University; Universidad de Chile; Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Game Theory and Mechanism Design are by now standard tools for studying and designing massive decentralized systems. Unfortunately, designing mechanisms that induce socially efficient outcomes often requires full information and prohibitively large computational resources. In this work we study simple mechanisms that require only local information. Specifically, in the setting of a classic scheduling problem, we demonstrate local mechanisms that induce outcomes with social cost close to that o...
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作者：Artemov, Georgy
作者单位：University of Melbourne
摘要：In this paper, we study the full implementation problem using mechanisms that allow a delay. The delay on the equilibrium path may be zero, an infinitesimally small number or a fixed positive number. In all these three cases, implementable rules are fully characterized by a monotonicity condition. We provide examples to show that some delayed implementable social choice rules are not implementable in Nash-equilibrium refinements without a delay. As an application of our approach, we characteri...
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作者：Chawla, Shuchi; Malec, David; Sivan, Balasubramanian
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We investigate the power of randomness in the context of a fundamental Bayesian optimal mechanism design problem a single seller aims to maximize expected revenue by allocating multiple kinds of resources to unit-demand agents with preferences drawn from a known distribution. When the agents' preferences are single-dimensional Myerson's seminal work (1981) shows that randomness offers no benefit the optimal mechanism is always deterministic. In the multi-dimensional case, when agents' preferen...
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作者：Bergantinos, Gustavo; Masso, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro
作者单位：Universidade de Vigo; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Universidad Nacional de San Luis; Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas (CONICET)
摘要：The division problem under constraints consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a subset of agents with single-peaked preferences on an exogenously given interval of feasible allotments. We characterize axiomatically the family of extended uniform rules proposed to solve the division problem under constraints. Rules in this family extend the uniform rule used to solve the classical division problem without constraints. We show that the family o...
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作者：Chen, Yi-Chun; Lehrer, Ehud; Li, Jiangtao; Samet, Dov; Shmaya, Eran
作者单位：National University of Singapore; Tel Aviv University; Tel Aviv University; Northwestern University
摘要：We say that agreeing to agree is possible for an event E if there exist posterior beliefs of the agents with a common prior such that it is common knowledge that the agents' posteriors for E coincide. We propose a notion called Dutch book which is a profile of interim contracts between an outsider and the agents based on the occurrence of E, such that the outsider makes positive profit in all states. We show that in a finite state space, when the agents cannot tell whether E occurred or not, a...
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作者：Graham, Brett; Bernhardt, Dan
作者单位：Xiamen University; Xiamen University; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital; University of Warwick
摘要：We derive the equilibrium institutional design of representative democracy by citizens who first vote on the supermajority required for a new policy to be adopted, and then delegate decision making to a legislature that selects policy given that institutional constraint. A legislature that can freely tailor policy to reflect society's current preferences is good. However, the views of the median legislator or agenda setter may differ from the median citizen's, and an unchecked legislature can ...
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作者：He, Wei; Yannelis, Nicholas C.
作者单位：University of Iowa
摘要：We introduce asymmetric information to games with discontinuous payoffs and prove new equilibrium existence theorems. In particular, the seminal work of Reny (1999) is extended to a Bayesian preferences framework. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
