Ambiguous language and common priors

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Halpern, Joseph Y.; Kets, Willemien
• 署名单位: Cornell University; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.01.007
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 171-180
• 关键词: Ambiguous language; common prior; Agree to disagree; Harsanyi doctrine

摘要

Standard economic models cannot capture the fact that information is often ambiguous, and is interpreted in multiple ways. Using a framework that distinguishes between the language in which statements are made and the interpretation of statements, we demonstrate that, unlike in the case where there is no ambiguity, players may come to have different beliefs starting from a common prior, even if they have received exactly the same information, unless the information is common knowledge. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.