Mandate and paternalism: A theory of large elections

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Faravelli, Marco; Man, Priscilla; Walsh, Randall
• 署名单位: University of Queensland; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.009
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 1-23
• 关键词: Mandate; turnout; Large elections; Costly voting; paternalism

摘要

We propose a game theoretic costly voting model of large elections that incorporates the assumption that mandate matters. This innovation is motivated by empirical evidence that US Representatives with larger victory margins on average vote in a more partisan manner. If voters are paternalistic, this new model predicts strictly positive limiting turnout rates as the population grows arbitrarily large. The model also preserves stylized comparative statics results of costly voting models, including the underdog effect and the competition effect. Finally, we develop an innovative computational strategy to solve the model for large, finite, electorates and show that our results are not only qualitatively, but also quantitatively relevant. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.