On bidding with securities: Risk aversion and positive dependence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Abhishek, Vineet; Hajek, Bruce; Williams, Steven R.
• 署名单位: University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.02.004
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 66-80
• 关键词: Security bidding; auction; Positive dependence; risk aversion

摘要

DeMarzo et al. (2005) consider auctions in which bids are selected from a completely ordered family of securities whose values are tied to the resource being auctioned. The paper defines a notion of relative steepness of families of securities and shows that a steeper family provides greater expected revenue to the seller. Two assumptions are: the buyers are risk neutral; the random variables through which values and signals of the buyers are realized are affiliated. We show that this revenue ranking holds for the second price auction in the case of risk aversion. However, it does not hold if affiliation is relaxed to a less restrictive form of positive dependence, namely first order stochastic dominance (FOSD). We define the relative strong steepness of families of securities and show that it provides a necessary and sufficient condition for comparing two families in the FOSD case. All results extend to the English auction. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.