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作者：Parravano, Melanie; Poulsen, Odile
作者单位：University of East Anglia; University of East Anglia; University of East Anglia
摘要：We collect data from symmetric and asymmetric coordination games with a focal point and vary the stake size. The data show that in symmetric games coordination on the label-salient strategy increases with stake size. By contrast, in asymmetric games the coordination rates do not vary with stake size and are close to the levels predicted by both the mixed Nash equilibrium and the level-k model used by Crawford et al. (2008). These findings suggest that players' mode of reasoning, and the extent...
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作者：Yildiz, Muhamet
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Under weak assumptions on the solution concept, I construct an invariant selection across all finite type spaces, in which the types with identical information play the same action. Along the way, I establish an interesting lattice structure for finite type spaces and construct an equilibrium on the space of all finite types. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Yoon, Kiho
作者单位：Korea University
摘要：We modify the dynamic pivot mechanism of Bergemann and Valimaki (Econometrica, 2010) in such a way that lump-sum fees are collected from the players. We show that the modified mechanism satisfies ex-ante budget balance as well as ex-post efficiency, periodic ex-post incentive compatibility, and periodic ex-post individual rationality, as long as the Markov chain representing the evolution of players' private information is irreducible and aperiodic and players are sufficiently patient. We also...
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作者：Malcomson, James M.
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：This paper extends Levin's (2003) relational contract model by having not only the agent's cost of effort (agent's type), but also the value of that effort to the principal (principal's type) subject to i.i.d. shocks. When optimal effort is fully pooled across agent types for multiple principal types, it is also pooled across those principal types. When optimal effort separates some agent types for multiple principal types, efforts of those agent types may be separated across principal types. ...
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作者：Compte, Olivier; Postlewaite, Andrew
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：There is a large repeated games literature illustrating how future interactions provide incentives for cooperation. Much of the earlier literature assumes public monitoring. Departures from public monitoring to private monitoring that incorporate differences in players' observations may dramatically complicate coordination and the provision of incentives, with the consequence that equilibria with private monitoring often seem unrealistically complex or fragile. We set out a model in which play...
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作者：Pope, Devin G.; Pope, Jaren C.; Sydnor, Justin R.
作者单位：University of Chicago; Brigham Young University; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Are focal points important for determining the outcome of high-stakes negotiations? We investigate this question by examining the role that round numbers play as focal points in negotiations in the housing market. Using a large dataset on home transactions in the U.S., we document sharp spikes in the distribution of final negotiated house pikes at round numbers, especially those divisible by $50,000. The patterns cannot be easily explained by simple stories of convenience rounding or by list p...
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作者：You, Jung S.
作者单位：California State University System; California State University East Bay
摘要：For the problem of assigning economic bads (for example, costly tasks or undesirable objects), Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms achieve efficient allocations via money transfers. However, they can produce arbitrarily large budget surpluses or deficits. We construct a performance index for a VCG mechanism to measure its budget surplus and deficit in the worst-case. Using this index, we develop mechanisms whose surpluses or deficits vanish as the number of participants increases, for both ...
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作者：Jiang, Albert Xin; Leyton-Brown, Kevin
作者单位：University of British Columbia
摘要：In a landmark paper, Papadimitriou and Roughgarden described a polynomial-time algorithm (Ellipsoid Against Hope) for computing sample correlated equilibria of concisely-represented games. Recently, Stein, Parrilo and Ozdaglar showed that this algorithm can fail to find an exact correlated equilibrium. We present a variant of the Ellipsoid Against Hope algorithm that guarantees the polynomial-time identification of exact correlated equilibrium. Our algorithm differs from the original primarily...
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作者：Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Predtetchinski, Arkadi
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：We consider the canonical non-cooperative multilateral bargaining game with a set of feasible payoffs that is closed and comprehensive from below, contains the disagreement point in its interior, and is such that the individually rational payoffs are bounded. We show that a pure stationary subgame perfect equilibrium having the no-delay property exists, even when the space of feasible payoffs is not convex. We also have the converse result that randomization will not be used in this environmen...
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作者：Balbus, Lukasz; Reffett, Kevin; Wozny, Lukasz
作者单位：University of Zielona Gora; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Warsaw School of Economics
摘要：Recently Yang and Qi (2013) stated an interesting theorem on the existence of complete lattice of equilibria in a particular class of large nonatomic supermodular games for general action and players spaces. Unfortunately, their result is incorrect. In this note, we detail the nature of the problem with the stated theorem, provide a counterexample, and then correct the result under additional assumptions. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
