Symmetry and impartial lotteries

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mackenzie, Andrew
• 署名单位: University of Rochester
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.08.007
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 15-28
• 关键词: symmetry; impartiality; Name independence; Voter anonymity; Candidate neutrality

摘要

A prize is to be awarded, so each candidate designates one of his peers on a ballot. The ballots determine the lottery that selects the winner, and impartiality requires that no candidate's choice of designee impacts his own chance of winning, removing incentives for strategic ballot submission. The primary results are (1) a characterization of all impartial rules that treat agents symmetrically as voters, and (2) a characterization of all impartial rules that treat agents symmetrically as candidates. Each rule in either class may be represented as a randomization over a finite set of simple rules. These results have immediate interpretation in a second context: the division of surplus among team members. Corollaries include the constant rule impossibility of Holzman and Moulin (2013), a new dictatorship impossibility, and the first axiomatic characterization of uniform random dictatorship. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.