Computation of equilibrium values in the Baron and Ferejohn bargaining model

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kalandrakis, Tasos
• 署名单位: University of Rochester
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.08.004
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 29-38
• 关键词: computation of equilibrium; Legislative bargaining; uniqueness

摘要

Computation of exact equilibrium values for n-player divide-the-dollar legislative bargaining games as in Baron and Ferejohn (1989) with general quota voting rules, recognition probabilities, and discount factors, can be achieved by solving at most n bivariate square linear systems of equations. The approach recovers Eraslan's (2002) uniqueness result and relies on a characterization of equilibria in terms of two variables that satisfy a pair of piecewise linear equations. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.