Strive to be first or avoid being last: An experiment on relative performance incentives

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dutcher, E. Glenn; Balafoutas, Loukas; Lindner, Florian; Ryvkin, Dmitry; Sutter, Matthias
• 署名单位: University System of Ohio; Ohio University; University of Innsbruck; State University System of Florida; Florida State University; University of Cologne
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.08.008
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 39-56
• 关键词: Tournament; Winner; Loser; CONTRACT; experiment; learning

摘要

We utilize a laboratory experiment to compare effort provision under optimal tournament contracts with different distributions of prizes which motivate agents to compete to be first, avoid being last, or both. We find that the combined tournament contract incorporating both incentives at the top and at the bottom induces the highest effort, especially in larger groups. Avoiding being last produces the lowest variance of effort and is more effective at motivating employees compared to competing for the top. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.